The U.S. Justice Department said late on Wednesday the federal government was liable in the fatal January 29 collision of an Army Black Hawk helicopter and American Airlines regional jet that killed 67 people near Reagan Washington National Airport.
www.reuters.com
"The Justice Department said a Federal Aviation Administration air traffic controller also did not comply with an FAA order and as a result of both agencies conduct the United States was liable for damages"
"The government said an air traffic controller did not comply with an FAA order about visual separation of aircraft."
Definitely want to see what the final NTSB report has to say, but this is what I’ve been saying all along…
[edit] Here’s the lawsuit text:
And the relevant part:
250. On January 29, 2025, Defendant USA, by and through the FAA and its air traffic
control personnel, was negligent and breached the duties it owed Plaintiff’s DECEDENT and
Plaintiff as follows:
a. The controller(s) negligently failed to give first priority to separating aircraft and
issuing safety alerts in violation of FAA Order JO 7110.65AA, ¶ 2-1-2, instead
prioritizing a departures push or other non-safety critical duties;
b. The controller(s) negligently failed to establish proper and safe separation
between AE 5342 and PAT25;
c. The controller(s) negligently failed to monitor the course and altitude of PAT25 to
ensure compliance with the published route and mandatory maximum published
altitude for Helicopter Route 4;
d. e. f. The controller(s) negligently failed to notify PAT25 that it was off course and
above the mandatory maximum altitude for Helicopter Route 4 and failed to
instruct PAT25 to immediately turn left to and descend until it was at or below
200 feet and remain clear of AE 5342;
The controllers negligently failed to notify AE 5342 of the presence of PAT25;
The controller(s) negligently violated FAA Order JO 7110.65AA ¶ 7-2-1 by
failing to follow the procedures for visual separation therein. The controller(s)
did not follow the mandatory procedures for Pilot-Applied Visual Separation.
More particularly:
i. The controller(s) failed to inform PAT25 at numerous critical times of the
position, direction, type and intentions of AE 5342 and failed to properly
confirm that PAT25 had AE 5342 in sight as required by JO 7110.65AA ¶
7-2-1 subsection a.2.(b)(1) and (2);
ii. The controller(s) failed to inform AE 5342 that it was on a converging
course with PAT25 and that visual separation was being applied, as
required by JO 7110.65AA subsection a.2.(d);
iii. The controller(s) failed to advise both pilots of the other aircraft and did
not inform either pilot that targets were likely to merge as required by JO
7110.65AA ¶ 7-2-1 subsection a.2.(e);
iv. Additionally, the controller(s) failed to issue positive control instructions
to either aircraft when vertical and/or lateral separation standards were not
ensured, and failed to use proper, specified phraseology in communicating
with the subject helicopter and aircraft. The controller(s) also never
provided AE 5342 with PAT25’s position, direction, type, and intentions;
The controller negligently failed to issue a safety or traffic alert to either PAT25 or
AE 5342 despite having radar data available in real time that showed the flight
tracks, altitudes and distance between PAT25 and AE 5342, and receiving a
Conflict Alert (CA) when the aircraft were within approximately 1.5 miles of each
other and on converging courses heading directly towards one another. This was
in violation of FAA Orders:
i. JO 7110.65AA, ¶ 2-1-6, Safety Alerts;
ii. JO 7110.65AA ¶ 7-6-1, Basic Radar Service to VFR Aircraft Terminal
and;
iii. JO 7110.65AA ¶ 5-1-4, Merging Target Procedures;
The controller(s) negligently failed to issue traffic alerts to AE 5342 and/or PAT25
in violation of FAA Orders, including but not limited to JO 7110.65AA, ¶ 2-1-21;
JO 7110.65AA ¶ 3-1-6; and JO 7110.65AA ¶ 3-1-6, on at least three separate
occasions, including:
i. Failing to inform AE 5342 of the helicopter traffic after AE 5342 accepted
the request to land on Runway 33 at approximately 8:43:06 p.m. The
controller should have informed AE 5342 of PAT25’s position, direction,
type, and intentions;
ii. Failing to provide AE 5342 specific and timely traffic alerts when it was
about 2 miles southeast of the airport, on a left base to Runway 33, with
the relative o’clock position, distance and altitude of PAT25 and informing
AE 5342 that PAT25 would transit the airspace by crossing the final
approach path to Runway 33;
iii. Failing to provide specific traffic alerts to PAT25 concerning AE 5342
after receiving a “CA” at approximately 8:47:39 p.m., when the controller
should have advised PAT25 of AE 5342’s “o’clock” position, distance and
altitude, and informed PAT25 that its flight path was converging with AE
5342 and the radar targets of both aircraft would merge;