Midair Collision DCA

The NTSB released their final report today:

Probable cause, emphasis mine:
The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path; their failure to regularly review and evaluate helicopter routes and available data, and their failure to act on recommendations to mitigate the risk of a midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA); as well as the air traffic system’s overreliance on visual separation in order to promote efficient traffic flow without consideration for the limitations of the see-and-avoid concept. Also causal was the lack of effective pilot-applied visual separation by the helicopter crew, which resulted in a midair collision.
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Earlier in this thread, people literally told me that they got a good readback that meets the requirements of visual separation would end their responsibility to separate those aircraft, and would "turn away from the scope and continue a conversation elsewhere," which I was shocked by. I think the bolded statement of the probable cause addresses that attitude, because that attitude is awful and doesn't belong in air traffic. Visual separation isn't a "get a good readback and you're done" kind of thing, it requires active folllow-up scanning, and traffic alerts if the aircraft involved don't appear to be in compliance with what they read back, which this situation certainly required. I hope the kinds of attitudes I saw in this thread change, because they make the air traffic system less safe.
 
Homsar said:
The NTSB released their final report today:

Probable cause, emphasis mine:


Earlier in this thread, people literally told me that they got a good readback that meets the requirements of visual separation would end their responsibility to separate those aircraft, and would "turn away from the scope and continue a conversation elsewhere," which I was shocked by. I think the bolded statement of the probable cause addresses that attitude, because that attitude is awful and doesn't belong in air traffic. Visual separation isn't a "get a good readback and you're done" kind of thing, it requires active folllow-up scanning, and traffic alerts if the aircraft involved don't appear to be in compliance with what they read back, which this situation certainly required. I hope the kinds of attitudes I saw in this thread change, because they make the air traffic system less safe.
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I'm mean somewhere between "turn away from the scope and continue a conversation elsewhere," and "I just don’t want to work next to someone working the way that controller did." is a reasonable take. Unless you're alleging that the controller was turned around having other conversations instead of working the other traffic on frequency.
 
my problem is visual separation can look extremely sketchy on thr scope. Prolly not so bad in a TRACON but in a center if your doing in on a huge scale it can look pretty bad.
 
Homsar said:
The NTSB released their final report today:

Probable cause, emphasis mine:


Earlier in this thread, people literally told me that they got a good readback that meets the requirements of visual separation would end their responsibility to separate those aircraft, and would "turn away from the scope and continue a conversation elsewhere," which I was shocked by. I think the bolded statement of the probable cause addresses that attitude, because that attitude is awful and doesn't belong in air traffic. Visual separation isn't a "get a good readback and you're done" kind of thing, it requires active folllow-up scanning, and traffic alerts if the aircraft involved don't appear to be in compliance with what they read back, which this situation certainly required. I hope the kinds of attitudes I saw in this thread change, because they make the air traffic system less safe.
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After the good read back their responsibility for separation did transfer to the helicopter crew. If you remember the audio from the accident, it is evident that the controller did not turn away because as the aircraft converged, the controller sensed something out of the ordinary because he asked again to make sure the helo still had the CRJ in sight. The controller did everything they could realistically do in that situation. The fact that they blame the FAA for allowing this helo route should not be that surprising and it has nothing to do with the actual cause of the crash which was the helicopter crew with the F up of the century.
They blame the procedure because they have a fix for that. They will change the routes for helicopters near DCA. FAA big wigs are able to show that they addressed the issue, congress is happy because they made sure something changed so this doesn’t happen again, and the DOD is for sure happy that the spotlight is taken away from one of their command qualified pilots and one of their check pilots’ catastrophic error.

Could you imagine if they cited the cause as the helicopter crew stating two times they will maintain visual separation and instead as a crew of 2, both allow themselves to collide with the CRJ. There is no easy fix for that cause. You would have to start by overhauling training requirements for certifying pilots nationwide to include how to not collide with another aircraft that you see. Also, The NTSB would have to find a way to recommend a path towards ensuring all current pilots know how to not collide with an aircraft that they see. Of course this is all outrageous because pilots should already know how to miss another aircraft. It would also cause a lot of fear in the minds of the traveling public to know how low pilot experience and ability is across the board these days.
 
32andBelow said:
my problem is visual separation can look extremely sketchy on thr scope. Prolly not so bad in a TRACON but in a center if your doing in on a huge scale it can look pretty bad.
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No it looks extremely sketchy in the TRACON too. The CA goes off all the time when using visual separation. Doesn't mean anything, because guess what, you're using visual separation.
 
Termine said:
No it looks extremely sketchy in the TRACON too. The CA goes off all the time when using visual separation. Doesn't mean anything, because guess what, you're using visual separation.
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Or sometimes they could be head on and the dude starts the decent when they are clear. I don’t know how I can prevent him from doing a dive bomb.
 
WWII_hero_Driscoll said:
After the good read back their responsibility for separation did transfer to the helicopter crew. If you remember the audio from the accident, it is evident that the controller did not turn away because as the aircraft converged, the controller sensed something out of the ordinary because he asked again to make sure the helo still had the CRJ in sight. The controller did everything they could realistically do in that situation. The fact that they blame the FAA for allowing this helo route should not be that surprising and it has nothing to do with the actual cause of the crash which was the helicopter crew with the F up of the century.
They blame the procedure because they have a fix for that. They will change the routes for helicopters near DCA. FAA big wigs are able to show that they addressed the issue, congress is happy because they made sure something changed so this doesn’t happen again, and the DOD is for sure happy that the spotlight is taken away from one of their command qualified pilots and one of their check pilots’ catastrophic error.

Could you imagine if they cited the cause as the helicopter crew stating two times they will maintain visual separation and instead as a crew of 2, both allow themselves to collide with the CRJ. There is no easy fix for that cause. You would have to start by overhauling training requirements for certifying pilots nationwide to include how to not collide with another aircraft that you see. Also, The NTSB would have to find a way to recommend a path towards ensuring all current pilots know how to not collide with an aircraft that they see. Of course this is all outrageous because pilots should already know how to miss another aircraft. It would also cause a lot of fear in the minds of the traveling public to know how low pilot experience and ability is across the board these days.
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Agreed all around.

The controller was under the assumption the HELO crew received the information that the CRJ was circling for 33 and not straight in for 31 (Or whatever the numbers were). He also assumed they received the full call of "Do you have the CRJ in sight' and "pass behind the CRJ" but apparently portions of both were blocked by the HELO by their own PTT and other transmissions.

DCA probably uses visual all the time, HELO's admitted in the report that they would say they had traffic in sight even though they didn't just to get clearance to do their thing.

The HELO crew fucked this up for sure. But there were many holes and one MAYBE could've been blocked if the traffic call on the second attempt included mileage and direction. It works just like it has a thousand other times - until it doesn't.
 
ATCJoe85 said:
Unless you're alleging that the controller was turned around having other conversations instead of working the other traffic on frequency.
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No, I’m saying posters earlier in this thread tried to say that once they get a good readback on visual separation, they would turn their eyes away from the radar/window and continue a conversation without scanning, just because they got a good readback. I’m saying that line of thinking is insane, and doesn’t belong in air traffic. If I get a good readback on anything, I’m still scanning those aircraft to ensure they’re doing what they agreed to do, and if I notice them not doing it, I’m issuing a safety alert or a control instruction to ensure they are separated, not shrugging my shoulders after a crash and saying “I got a good readback of visual separation, not my problem, there was nothing more I could have done.” I don’t understand how anyone could think that way.

WWII_hero_Driscoll said:
The controller did everything they could realistically do in that situation.
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That’s completely incorrect, and is exactly the attitude I’m talking about. No merging target procedures, no safety alerts, no control instruction issued after the helicopter was clearly observed not flying in a manner consistent with passing behind the jet.

The NTSB details what could have happened had the controller issued the appropriate safety alert, too, on page 231 of the report:

When the LC controller recognized that the two aircraft were in unsafe proximity, the most appropriate action would have been to issue safety alerts to both aircraft regarding the other aircraft’s position and distance and to issue positive control instructions to the pilots that would have prevented their courses from converging, such as climb, descend, or turn, as appropriate. However, the controller’s traffic call to PAT25 at this time provided no information that could have assisted the crew in visually locating and positively identifying the airplane nor did it contain positive control instructions that the crew could have taken to resolve the conflict.
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Additionally, the controller did not issue a safety alert to flight 5342, contrary to merging target procedures. Timely issuance of positive control instructions by the controller and subsequent compliance with those instructions by the flight crew(s) could have averted the impending collision. The NTSB concludes that if the LC controller had issued a standard safety alert to the flight crews of either aircraft as prescribed in FAA Order JO 7110.65, providing the conflicting aircraft’s position and positive control instructions, the crew of either aircraft could have taken immediate action to avert the impending collision.
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Now, I want to be clear, I wasn’t in the cab that day so I don’t know what the controller was thinking/doing and thus don’t blame them directly, but we should take this incident/this report as an important critique of the culture of relying on visual separation as something that is “complete” once you get a good readback, and adjust our culture/attitudes accordingly.
 
Homsar said:
No, I’m saying posters earlier in this thread tried to say that once they get a good readback on visual separation, they would turn their eyes away from the radar/window and continue a conversation without scanning, just because they got a good readback. I’m saying that line of thinking is insane, and doesn’t belong in air traffic. If I get a good readback on anything, I’m still scanning those aircraft to ensure they’re doing what they agreed to do, and if I notice them not doing it, I’m issuing a safety alert or a control instruction to ensure they are separated, not shrugging my shoulders after a crash and saying “I got a good readback of visual separation, not my problem, there was nothing more I could have done.” I don’t understand how anyone could think that way.


That’s completely incorrect, and is exactly the attitude I’m talking about. No merging target procedures, no safety alerts, no control instruction issued after the helicopter was clearly observed not flying in a manner consistent with passing behind the jet.

The NTSB details what could have happened had the controller issued the appropriate safety alert, too, on page 231 of the report:




Now, I want to be clear, I wasn’t in the cab that day so I don’t know what the controller was thinking/doing and thus don’t blame them directly, but we should take this incident/this report as an important critique of the culture of relying on visual separation as something that is “complete” once you get a good readback, and adjust our culture/attitudes accordingly.
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It just seems to me that your attitude about the controller is in line with the attitude you take towards the people who would "turn their eyes away from the radar/window and continue a conversation without scanning, just because they got a good readback." ---even though you're not alleging that's what they did.
 
ATCJoe85 said:
It just seems to me that your attitude about the controller is in line with the attitude you take towards the people who would "turn their eyes away from the radar/window and continue a conversation without scanning, just because they got a good readback." ---even though you're not alleging that's what they did.
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The culture of that is what I have a problem with, yes. I don’t blame the controller, I blame the controller’s trainers and other controllers who have that attitude towards responsibilities during the use of visual separation. That culture needs to change.
 
When I first started training, my instructors were from the 70s and 80s. The attitude toward VFRs was pretty simple: they need to see and be seen, and controllers just need to provide traffic calls and safety alerts. I'm not sure if I was reading it right, but I felt there was a "F 'em they're VFR" attitude. Apart from specific LOA or SOP reasons, assigning hard altitudes or issuing vectors were treated as unneeded.

My facility used to even busier than when I got there so I trusted they had the experience and had it all correct. There was a lot of "traffic is...traffic...traffic...traffic...traffic alert, descend immediately...turn heading...etc." It seemed like more work to do a million traffic calls and then have to do an alert with control instructions.

After checkout I started doing a lot more vectoring and altitude assignments on VFRs. If I saw something developing I just moved them or whatever earlier to help myself and not have to talk a million times with traffic calls. I've been training others this way ever since as well.

Pilot-applied visual separation is awesome and can help alleviate some workload, but the controller still has to monitor the situation and make sure it's all working as intended, and that nothing worse is developing. I've had a ton of cases where the pilot came back and said they lost the traffic; sometimes another traffic call was enough to get them back in line, but sometimes it required a vector or altitude change. It's all very situational, but we are ultimately responsible for separation so don't get too comfortable with pilots.

After talking with some people in the NTSB about DCA, I'm not going to be surprised if the FAA restricts or bans some or all types of visual separation. I hope I'm wrong.
 
Unable is a full sentence said:
When I first started training, my instructors were from the 70s and 80s. The attitude toward VFRs was pretty simple: they need to see and be seen, and controllers just need to provide traffic calls and safety alerts. I'm not sure if I was reading it right, but I felt there was a "F 'em they're VFR" attitude. Apart from specific LOA or SOP reasons, assigning hard altitudes or issuing vectors were treated as unneeded.

My facility used to even busier than when I got there so I trusted they had the experience and had it all correct. There was a lot of "traffic is...traffic...traffic...traffic...traffic alert, descend immediately...turn heading...etc." It seemed like more work to do a million traffic calls and then have to do an alert with control instructions.

After checkout I started doing a lot more vectoring and altitude assignments on VFRs. If I saw something developing I just moved them or whatever earlier to help myself and not have to talk a million times with traffic calls. I've been training others this way ever since as well.

Pilot-applied visual separation is awesome and can help alleviate some workload, but the controller still has to monitor the situation and make sure it's all working as intended, and that nothing worse is developing. I've had a ton of cases where the pilot came back and said they lost the traffic; sometimes another traffic call was enough to get them back in line, but sometimes it required a vector or altitude change. It's all very situational, but we are ultimately responsible for separation so don't get too comfortable with pilots.

After talking with some people in the NTSB about DCA, I'm not going to be surprised if the FAA restricts or bans some or all types of visual separation. I hope I'm wrong.
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Class B is a different animal than what you are describing your trainers doing.
 
Unable is a full sentence said:
When I first started training, my instructors were from the 70s and 80s. The attitude toward VFRs was pretty simple: they need to see and be seen, and controllers just need to provide traffic calls and safety alerts. I'm not sure if I was reading it right, but I felt there was a "F 'em they're VFR" attitude. Apart from specific LOA or SOP reasons, assigning hard altitudes or issuing vectors were treated as unneeded.

My facility used to even busier than when I got there so I trusted they had the experience and had it all correct. There was a lot of "traffic is...traffic...traffic...traffic...traffic alert, descend immediately...turn heading...etc." It seemed like more work to do a million traffic calls and then have to do an alert with control instructions.

After checkout I started doing a lot more vectoring and altitude assignments on VFRs. If I saw something developing I just moved them or whatever earlier to help myself and not have to talk a million times with traffic calls. I've been training others this way ever since as well.

Pilot-applied visual separation is awesome and can help alleviate some workload, but the controller still has to monitor the situation and make sure it's all working as intended, and that nothing worse is developing. I've had a ton of cases where the pilot came back and said they lost the traffic; sometimes another traffic call was enough to get them back in line, but sometimes it required a vector or altitude change. It's all very situational, but we are ultimately responsible for separation so don't get too comfortable with pilots.

After talking with some people in the NTSB about DCA, I'm not going to be surprised if the FAA restricts or bans some or all types of visual separation. I hope I'm wrong.
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If the FAA bans all types of visual separation they would dramatically slow the traffic across the entire country. Think SFO unable to use visual between their parallel finals... towers unable to use visual between successive departures.... approaches unable to use visual between successive arrivals... etc. It would be a hot mess.
 
GulfBravoPapa said:
If the FAA bans all types of visual separation they would dramatically slow the traffic across the entire country. Think SFO unable to use visual between their parallel finals... towers unable to use visual between successive departures.... approaches unable to use visual between successive arrivals... etc. It would be a hot mess.
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Yes, and this is why the NTSB brushes past the helicopter crew’s fatal error and tries to put the majority of the blame on the special helicopter route. The present day pilot’s lack of skill and experience is concerning and in this case caused a crew of 2 to allow their aircraft to hit another aircraft that they saw and we trying to miss. The FAA would have to create and enforce a “fix” for this and FAA management does not have the energy or the intelligence to create and implement training and procedures for a can of worms like this.
 
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