Midair Collision DCA

Homsar said:
When, if ever, would you issue a traffic alert? Do you think one was warranted in this situation?

I can’t imagine looking at the leaked replay, seeing the altitude and history trails of those two targets, and not issuing a traffic alert. I’m also shocked that this is somehow a minority opinion on here.

There’s so much that the local could have done, and I struggle to understand those who say otherwise.

I’ll wait for the NTSB to professionally say who is at fault, but I would never work traffic like that, and never accept a trainee working like that during OJT.
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Spoken like someone who has never worked in a tower, you’d be issuing traffic alerts 50x a day if this was the metric
 
NovemberOscar said:
Spoken like someone who has never worked in a tower, you’d be issuing traffic alerts 50x a day if this was the metric
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Exactly! Especially when you do simultaneous ops to parallel runways, that have the required distance between the edges, with VFR pattern traffic. The stupid computer system on the STARS doesn’t know the 2 aircraft on opposing bases to the parallels have each other in sight, have been issued the traffic advisories, and are landing to different runways.
 
DOD4Life said:
Exactly! Especially when you do simultaneous ops to parallel runways, that have the required distance between the edges, with VFR pattern traffic. The stupid computer system on the STARS doesn’t know the 2 aircraft on opposing bases to the parallels have each other in sight, have been issued the traffic advisories, and are landing to different runways.
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I don’t know what’s worse.
This what you just said or when you have two targets merging and the CA goes off once they are tail to tail 🙄
 
DOD4Life said:
Exactly! Especially when you do simultaneous ops to parallel runways, that have the required distance between the edges, with VFR pattern traffic. The stupid computer system on the STARS doesn’t know the 2 aircraft on opposing bases to the parallels have each other in sight, have been issued the traffic advisories, and are landing to different runways.
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CA slew enter . The best is when they pass and are headed apart and then go off. 😆
 
32andBelow said:
A traffic alert is so they can see the traffic and take action. If they are telling you they see the traffic then I don’t know what else to say. I guess I can vector everyone but then your just saying visual separation isn’t a thing anymore.
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This is incorrect. A traffic alert ALSO includes the phraseology "advice you..." for ATC to include an "action" for aircraft involved to take. There will many instances when pilots aren't going to see each other before or during the conflict - if at all. ATC only not take "action" if the pilots advice they are (already) taking their own "action(s)".

At this point, the investigators do not believe the HELO intentionally flew into the CRJ. Sooo...while the HELO did say they would maintain visual, the way they continued to fly contradicted that. The HELO pilots did either not see the (correct) aircraft, did not understand where/what the CRJ was going to do, lost situatable awareness, or a combination of those. A pilot can only (continue to) maintain visual separation if they actually see the other (correct) traffic AND have a good mental model/picture. That's the purpose of ATC, to make sure everyone stays separated.

If you listen to the audio, the Controller observed that the HELO pilots weren't doing a good job maintaining visual; that's why he went back to the HELO to verify a second time - he was concerned. In my opinion though, there wasn't enough time/space to just verify. Wearing my shoes, I would have either vectored the HELO &/or sent the CRJ around. Again, that's me with my preference of working traffic.
 
+TSRA said:
This is incorrect. A traffic alert ALSO includes the phraseology "advice you..." for ATC to include an "action" for aircraft involved to take. There will many instances when pilots aren't going to see each other before or during the conflict - if at all. ATC only not take "action" if the pilots advice they are (already) taking their own "action(s)".

At this point, the investigators do not believe the HELO intentionally flew into the CRJ. Sooo...while the HELO did say they would maintain visual, the way they continued to fly contradicted that. The HELO pilots did either not see the (correct) aircraft, did not understand where/what the CRJ was going to do, lost situatable awareness, or a combination of those. A pilot can only (continue to) maintain visual separation if they actually see the other (correct) traffic AND have a good mental model/picture. That's the purpose of ATC, to make sure everyone stays separated.

If you listen to the audio, the Controller observed that the HELO pilots weren't doing a good job maintaining visual; that's why he went back to the HELO to verify a second time - he was concerned. In my opinion though, there wasn't enough time/space to just verify. Wearing my shoes, I would have either vectored the HELO &/or sent the CRJ around. Again, that's me with my preference of working traffic.
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Couldn’t haven’t said it better myself.

There’s a time when being “legal” isn’t enough, you have to project that an aircraft isn’t going to do what it agreed to do, and you need to step in and direct it to do something else. It’s not issuing a safety alert every time the CA goes off, it’s issuing one when, in your judgment, separation will not take place. How anyone can project the course/altitude of the helicopter in that leaked radar clip and not think that instructed separation will not take place is mind boggling to me:

PapaKilo1317 said:
https://twitter.com/x/status/1884827088437264387
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Almost never is just one party or thing to blame in accidents. There were many things done wrong here that all had to happen for this to take place. This started long before that night.

1. The actively used heli routes near landing traffic with merely hundreds of feet or less of "separation".
2. The CA system being unreliable, it goes off all the time.. very high % of CA alarms in towers are useless. They do not have the effect outsiders or higher management think they do. We get so used to them going off that they don't carry the weight some wish they did. I have seen close calls where the CA goes off after the planes are a mile already past eachother.
3. Visual separation with helicopters that normally use airspace, how often do they actually have traffic in sight and can maintain it? Are they just saying they do to get their job done? Should visual separation be allowed under NVGs?
4. Many TCAS-RA problems under simular conditions, but nothing solid done about it? Where was management before? LSC? I honestly wonder if some controllers hated that operation but felt pressured into doing it to keep rate high and let the helis do their mission at the same time?
5. Could the controller legally have even given the helicopter a heading?
 
DADDYSbabyBIRD said:
Almost never is just one party or thing to blame in accidents. There were many things done wrong here that all had to happen for this to take place. This started long before that night.

1. The actively used heli routes near landing traffic with merely hundreds of feet or less of "separation".
2. The CA system being unreliable, it goes off all the time.. very high % of CA alarms in towers are useless. They do not have the effect outsiders or higher management think they do. We get so used to them going off that they don't carry the weight some wish they did. I have seen close calls where the CA goes off after the planes are a mile already past eachother.
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I don’t disagree with any of this.

DADDYSbabyBIRD said:
3. Visual separation with helicopters that normally use airspace, how often do they actually have traffic in sight and can maintain it? Are they just saying they do to get their job done? Should visual separation be allowed under NVGs?
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At my tower, helicopters are great at getting other helicopters and planes in sight and avoiding them, so I trust them when they say they do, but issue instructions to deconflict them if I scan and see they’re not doing what they say they would do. It happens, that’s why we’re controllers.

DADDYSbabyBIRD said:
4. Many TCAS-RA problems under simular conditions, but nothing solid done about it? Where was management before? LSC? I honestly wonder if some controllers hated that operation but felt pressured into doing it to keep rate high and let the helis do their mission at the same time?
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No disagreement here. Lots of questions.
DADDYSbabyBIRD said:
5. Could the controller legally have even given the helicopter a heading?
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I’m not up on my Bravo rules, but in a Delta, sure, as a suggestion, or issue a safety alert and suggest they start an immediate left turn north eastbound due to traffic without specifying a heading. In that twitter post I shared, unless I saw the helicopter turning out the window and figured it was just radar lag, I would have started that left turn literally at the start of that video, because there’s no way the helicopter’s projected course and speed would place them behind the jet.
 
DADDYSbabyBIRD said:
Almost never is just one party or thing to blame in accidents. There were many things done wrong here that all had to happen for this to take place. This started long before that night.

1. The actively used heli routes near landing traffic with merely hundreds of feet or less of "separation".
2. The CA system being unreliable, it goes off all the time.. very high % of CA alarms in towers are useless. They do not have the effect outsiders or higher management think they do. We get so used to them going off that they don't carry the weight some wish they did. I have seen close calls where the CA goes off after the planes are a mile already past eachother.
3. Visual separation with helicopters that normally use airspace, how often do they actually have traffic in sight and can maintain it? Are they just saying they do to get their job done? Should visual separation be allowed under NVGs?
4. Many TCAS-RA problems under simular conditions, but nothing solid done about it? Where was management before? LSC? I honestly wonder if some controllers hated that operation but felt pressured into doing it to keep rate high and let the helis do their mission at the same time?
5. Could the controller legally have even given the helicopter a heading?
Click to expand...
As a regular NVG user, I absolutely do not think pilot applied visual should be allowed if one of the aircrews involved is wearing NVGs, the FAR/AIM should advise all pilots to reject this from ATC if wearing them. I also don’t think anyone should be authorized to operate in class bravo airspace while using NVGs, even the military. This is a big continent and there are plenty of places to practice using that shit besides right near the final of a core 30 airport.

I am honestly surprised we aren’t seeing the DoD being slapped on the wrist for this considering a good portion of this tragic accident happened from the inherent traffic burden of a training sortie…
 
SquawkHijack said:
As a regular NVG user, I absolutely do not think pilot applied visual should be allowed if one of the aircrews involved is wearing NVGs, the FAR/AIM should advise all pilots to reject this from ATC if wearing them. I also don’t think anyone should be authorized to operate in class bravo airspace while using NVGs, even the military. This is a big continent and there are plenty of places to practice using that shit besides right near the final of a core 30 airport.

I am honestly surprised we aren’t seeing the DoD being slapped on the wrist for this considering a good portion of this tragic accident happened from the inherent traffic burden of a training sortie…
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This is the most logical and correct answer to this whole disaster. The NVG stuff should be practiced in a setting where the environment is strictly conducive to them. Anyone who has ever worked an NVG approach knows that pilots are INCREDIBLY sensitive to light with the goggles on. Wearing the goggles while everyone and everything around them was fully lit was just asking for issues.
 
But_I_Had_Visual said:
This is the most logical and correct answer to this whole disaster. The NVG stuff should be practiced in a setting where the environment is strictly conducive to them. Anyone who has ever worked an NVG approach knows that pilots are INCREDIBLY sensitive to light with the goggles on. Wearing the goggles while everyone and everything around them was fully lit was just asking for issues.
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The pilots themselves aren’t sensitive to light, in that their NVGs don’t get any brighter than a lit screen in front of your eye, that’s what autogating is for. But rather the image intensifier tubes themselves are VERY sensitive and will bloom out brighter things, which is why I’d be shocked if the Blackhawk didn’t see the strobes/anti-collision lights of the CRJ at all.

Regardless, shit is a special niche of aviation and has no business in places like this or used in conjunction with pilot-applied visual separation. Let’s be honest, pilots using NODs for real operations aren’t going to be flying anywhere where they need to be dodging other airplanes like this.
 
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