New York Times names Controller involved with AUS FedEx/Southwest Incident

[TangoBearFox]

NTSB released their final report on the incident:

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AIR2402.pdf

Some of my favorite takeaways from reading the report:

The NTSB issued Safety Recommendation in July 6 2000, to install ASDE-X at most airports.

The FAA has said over many years they will not because it's too expensive. A quick google says there are currently 35 ASDE airports at a cost of 550 million to install. (15 million per system). Doesn't seem that much considering massive loss of life and property is the alternative.

The controller messed up, everyone knows that by now, everything in the report points to the controller messing up basic rules, expectation bias. He didn't fix it when it clearly wasn't going to work. He said he thought at the time it would have been more dangerous to send the FedEx around inside of 2 miles so they wouldnt climb into each other.

The SWA plane also did a 20 second run up on the RWY which didnt help either. The report talked about the controller's CPAP alot but said it wasn't a factor. Also, he recertified Local in February 2024 (congrats man).

The report talked about SMGCS alot but then came to the conclusion that it wouldn't have prevented the incident from occurring.

According to their SMGCS plan they have to use the same runway 18L for arrivals and departures when RVR for 18R falls below 1600 ft. Idk, how using the same runway during low visibility operations is safer and why the airport can't plan on upgrading lighting to prevent this but that seems like a reasonable solution to me and we can't have that.

FDX pilots are the heroes of this incident along with TCAS. SWA pilots in this incident should have done better between calling ready when they no where near the hold short and not communicating that they need time on the runway for an ENGINE RUN UP, but they also used TCAS to adjust their rate of climb to not die so that was good.

TLDR:
Controller very bad.
FDX pilots very good.
SWA pilots could have been better.

 

[HurryUpandWait]

The NTSB issued Safety Recommendation in July 6 2000, to install ASDE-X at most airports.

The FAA has said over many years they will not because it's too expensive. A quick google says there are currently 35 ASDE airports at a cost of 550 million to install. (15 million per system). Doesn't seem that much considering massive loss of life and property is the alternative.

And we have controllers they don’t care about what equipment they are using.

 

[32andBelow]

And we have controllers they don’t care about what equipment they are using.

We can care but we shouldn’t spend any bargaining capital working on it.

 

[Termine]

The NTSB issued Safety Recommendation in July 6 2000, to install ASDE-X at most airports.

And that was an overwrite of a 1991 recommendation for essentially the same thing, if I understood what they were saying right.

Also after reading the details I have a little more sympathy for the controller. Aircraft on a 4-mile final is only doing 130kt and you have SWA claim to be ready? That should work—on a clear day, temps above freezing, if the aircraft is actually at the hold-short line. As it turned out, on a LIFR day with freezing fog and when the departure is 550' away from the hold-short when they call... not so much. But I can see where he got tripped up, at least for the initial decision to issue the takeoff clearance.

On another note, WTF is going on with Austin's radar feed that they can't see someone once they dip below 800' AGL on approach to the primary airport? That's a 2.5-mile final. That's unacceptable. Add in the fact that everyone has ADS-B now and there's just no excuse not to have coverage to runway.

 

[Gauff]

On another note, WTF is going on with Austin's radar feed that they can't see someone once they dip below 800' AGL on approach to the primary airport? That's a 2.5-mile final. That's unacceptable. Add in the fact that everyone has ADS-B now and there's just no excuse not to have coverage to runway.

Curious on where you got that info and how you think that would have solved an issue that happened in the tower. Cause as far as I know they have radar to the ground essentially, so idk where you got the 800' agl or how that'd make a difference with the tower deal

 

[Wizard]

And that was an overwrite of a 1991 recommendation for essentially the same thing, if I understood what they were saying right.

Also after reading the details I have a little more sympathy for the controller. Aircraft on a 4-mile final is only doing 130kt and you have SWA claim to be ready? That should work—on a clear day, temps above freezing, if the aircraft is actually at the hold-short line. As it turned out, on a LIFR day with freezing fog and when the departure is 550' away from the hold-short when they call... not so much. But I can see where he got tripped up, at least for the initial decision to issue the takeoff clearance.

On another note, WTF is going on with Austin's radar feed that they can't see someone once they dip below 800' AGL on approach to the primary airport? That's a 2.5-mile final. That's unacceptable. Add in the fact that everyone has ADS-B now and there's just no excuse not to have coverage to runway.

You have sympathy for someone trying to stick someone out in a 4 mile gap in zero vis with the next arrival 10 states away?

 

[KP-ATC]

Some of my favorite takeaways from reading the report:

The NTSB issued Safety Recommendation in July 6 2000, to install ASDE-X at most airports.

The FAA has said over many years they will not because it's too expensive. A quick google says there are currently 35 ASDE airports at a cost of 550 million to install. (15 million per system). Doesn't seem that much considering massive loss of life and property is the alternative.

The controller messed up, everyone knows that by now, everything in the report points to the controller messing up basic rules, expectation bias. He didn't fix it when it clearly wasn't going to work. He said he thought at the time it would have been more dangerous to send the FedEx around inside of 2 miles so they wouldnt climb into each other.

The SWA plane also did a 20 second run up on the RWY which didnt help either. The report talked about the controller's CPAP alot but said it wasn't a factor. Also, he recertified Local in February 2024 (congrats man).

The report talked about SMGCS alot but then came to the conclusion that it wouldn't have prevented the incident from occurring.

According to their SMGCS plan they have to use the same runway 18L for arrivals and departures when RVR for 18R falls below 1600 ft. Idk, how using the same runway during low visibility operations is safer and why the airport can't plan on upgrading lighting to prevent this but that seems like a reasonable solution to me and we can't have that.

FDX pilots are the heroes of this incident along with TCAS. SWA pilots in this incident should have done better between calling ready when they no where near the hold short and not communicating that they need time on the runway for an ENGINE RUN UP, but they also used TCAS to adjust their rate of climb to not die so that was good.

TLDR:
Controller very bad.
FDX pilots very good.
SWA pilots could have been better.

With an iPad and an ADS-B receiver running on free EFB software I can see traffic moving around an airport. A setup like this is less than $2k. Controllers should be able to use this for situational awareness. Every tower doesn't need full blown ASDE but there is no excuse for prohibiting basic situational awareness tools.

 

[Stinger]

On another note, WTF is going on with Austin's radar feed that they can't see someone once they dip below 800' AGL on approach to the primary airport?

His answers were confusing, but it only makes sense if it's MSL. That'd be 200-300 AGL.
And he also said the tower was 900 feet tall.

I'd recommend reading through all 293 pages of the ATC interview transcript. There's some very interesting things in there. Also don't miss the Contract Weather Observer interview. It starts on Page 238. They have no internet, no equipment other than an ASOS, and are a couple floors up the building in a room with no windows. Doesn't really impact the SWA/FDX incident, but just as an overall view of what they're dealing with, you should read it.

With an iPad and an ADS-B receiver running on free EFB software I can see traffic moving around an airport. A setup like this is less than $2k. Controllers should be able to use this for situational awareness. Every tower doesn't need full blown ASDE but there is no excuse for prohibiting basic situational awareness tools.

In Austin they had been using FlightRadar 24 on a monitor on the desk in the tower.
And FAA approved uAvionix to provide basically the exact system you're talking about.

uAvionix to Provide Surface Situational Awareness to Air Traffic Control Towers at U.S. Airports - uAvionix

Iris Automation and uAvionix announce strategic partnership for combined Command and Control (C2) and Detect and Avoid (DAA) services.

uavionix.com

 

[AB19]

With an iPad and an ADS-B receiver running on free EFB software I can see traffic moving around an airport. A setup like this is less than $2k. Controllers should be able to use this for situational awareness. Every tower doesn't need full blown ASDE but there is no excuse for prohibiting basic situational awareness tools.

You can go on adsb exchange and see some ground movement at some places that don't have asde

 

[Homsar]

Curious on where you got that info and how you think that would have solved an issue that happened in the tower. Cause as far as I know they have radar to the ground essentially, so idk where you got the 800' agl or how that'd make a difference with the tower deal

The NTSB put out a video a few weeks ago, they talk about the loss of radar coverage at about 4:03 in it.

Also after reading the details I have a little more sympathy for the controller. Aircraft on a 4-mile final is only doing 130kt and you have SWA claim to be ready? That should work—on a clear day, temps above freezing, if the aircraft is actually at the hold-short line. As it turned out, on a LIFR day with freezing fog and when the departure is 550' away from the hold-short when they call... not so much. But I can see where he got tripped up, at least for the initial decision to issue the takeoff clearance.

The video above says the controller advises SWA that FDX is on a *three* mile final with the takeoff clearance at about the 3:30 mark. The report says they were actually on a 3.9 final, but the controller believed it was three miles and said as such. SWA needs to have to moved from their present location to actually being in the takeoff roll prior to FDX reaching a 2 mile final to have 2 increasing to 3, and the controller didn’t issue an immediate takeoff clearance. With all of that said, I don’t have much sympathy for the controller, because the decision to clear SWA without immediate just isn’t a good one. Just wait for FDX to land.

[edit] I thought these three sections from the report were pretty telling too:

During a postincident interview, the controller reported that he and the operations supervisor had told departing flight crews to report when their airplanes were "holding short" and that "when they got to the [approach] end, they [were] holding short." The ATC recordings provided no evidence supporting the controller's statement.

So, they lied? Should be pretty easy to pull tapes from GC and find those instructions given to the SWA in question and other A/C.

The controller stated that, if he had instructed the FedEx airplane to go around when it was inside 2 miles, the SWA airplane could have been rotating, which would have made the situation "even worse."

He didn’t think to issue a Go-Around to FDX and give them literally any sort of turn, like 30 degrees in either direction? I’m not familiar with AUS’ airspace, but I don’t think it’s surrounded by mountains where a 30 degree turn would cause a terrain issue.

The controller also stated that he "definitely could have held" the SWA airplane because "there was no pressure to expedite" the departure.

I mean, plain as day right here. No reason to run a squeeze play.


No sympathy for the controller here. Clearly a series of poor decisions and nonsensical thought processes.

 

[Dolan]

Anyone who wants an ASDE but doesn't have one at your airport, now you know how to get one!

 

[PooseMaGoose]

The NTSB put out a video a few weeks ago, they talk about the loss of radar coverage at about 4:03 in it.

The video above says the controller advises SWA that FDX is on a *three* mile final with the takeoff clearance at about the 3:30 mark. The report says they were actually on a 3.9 final, but the controller believed it was three miles and said as such. SWA needs to have to moved from their present location to actually being in the takeoff roll prior to FDX reaching a 2 mile final to have 2 increasing to 3, and the controller didn’t issue an immediate takeoff clearance. With all of that said, I don’t have much sympathy for the controller, because the decision to clear SWA without immediate just isn’t a good one. Just wait for FDX to land.

[edit] I thought these three sections from the report were pretty telling too:



So, they lied? Should be pretty easy to pull tapes from GC and find those instructions given to the SWA in question and other A/C.



He didn’t think to issue a Go-Around to FDX and give them literally any sort of turn, like 30 degrees in either direction? I’m not familiar with AUS’ airspace, but I don’t think it’s surrounded by mountains where a 30 degree turn would cause a terrain issue.



I mean, plain as day right here. No reason to run a squeeze play.


No sympathy for the controller here. Clearly a series of poor decisions and nonsensical thought processes.

That animation is sobering man. Jesus. And I agree... this was all done under the ASSUMPTION that "SWA typically rolls fast" during a time where nothing could be verified visually from the tower.

Bottom line, ATC left his job of keeping aircraft separated to the FDX pilots and to God. And for what benefit?? The next arrival wasn't even on radar. Fucking insane. Somebody needs to spank that boy.

 

[Termine]

Curious on where you got that info

NTSB report, section 2.2.3. Page 49. "However, after descending through 800 ft agl, the FedEx airplane’s information would no longer have been displayed on the workstation (due to the limitations of the radar system that the workstation used)."

His answers were confusing, but it only makes sense if it's MSL. That'd be 200-300 AGL.

Yeah I was wondering if that might be the case but the report says 800 AGL. Could be a mistake in the report, or could be the report accepting the controller's statement without checking (which would surprise me). 200-300 AGL is much more understandable.

You have sympathy for someone trying to stick someone out in a 4 mile gap in zero vis with the next arrival 10 states away?

I have sympathy for the initial decision... if you look section 1.8.2.2, the other two SWA departures that morning were both rolling in less than a minute from the takeoff clearance, significantly less time than any of the other departures. And if the controller thought SWA was calling at the hold-short line, a four-mile gap is more than enough space—again, assuming a clear day and assuming no freezing fog.

That said I've always used the rule of thumb that it takes ~90-100 seconds for an air carrier to be airborne if they're starting from a dead stop at the hold-short. About 30-40 seconds to get on the runway, another 60 seconds to accelerate and rotate. That morning the average time between takeoff clearance and the aircraft starting to roll was 78 seconds, according to NSTB calculations. Even for the other SWA departures it was longer than what I would consider "normal" on a clear day. Some of that can be attributed to them calling ready before they were actually at the line, some of it can be attributed to the runup. Either way it shifts the calculus against the decision to roll them. Totally agree with you there.

I'm just saying that if you take out the context of what was going on with the weather, and you just look at the numbers: Four-mile gap, 130kt, SWA calls ready. I wouldn't think twice about launching SWA. That's if 1) it's a clear day and 2) they're actually at the hold-short line.

Of course things are going to be different when there's freezing fog and airplanes are being deiced and they need to do a static runup to clear the deice fluid out of the engines... and when you can't even freaking see the hold-short line from the tower cab. We're paid to consider the context of the weather and everything else when issuing the takeoff clearance; he didn't do that and I'm not defending the overall decision. Just saying it was a little bit more understandable than I thought at first. A little bit.

The video above says the controller advises SWA that FDX is on a *three* mile final with the takeoff clearance at about the 3:30 mark. The report says they were actually on a 3.9 final, but the controller believed it was three miles and said as such.

You've never fudged a distance to impart some urgency to the departure? I'll agree though, supposing he actually did think they were at a three-mile final then that's never going to work 2 increasing to 3. And he did not, in fact, impart any urgency at all when issuing the clearance.

 

[Termine]

They have no internet, no equipment other than an ASOS, and are a couple floors up the building in a room with no windows.

This deserves its own reply. Just.... what??? No windows at all? What the hell is the point of them even being there, then?

At least if you're a LAWRS tower you can look out the cab windows and observe the low-lying fog or incoming squall line or whatever. If you're just sitting in a dark room watching the ASOS cut a speci... jeez.

 

[Homsar]

You've never fudged a distance to impart some urgency to the departure? I'll agree though, supposing he actually did think they were at a three-mile final then that's never going to work 2 increasing to 3. And he did not, in fact, impart any urgency at all when issuing the clearance.

I didn’t think about fudging distances, you’re right, but giving that benefit of the doubt, I’ve always paired it with a sense of urgency (immediate takeoff, telling them to start their roll, report rolling in cases of near zero visibility, etc), which was absolutely not present here.

 

[Wizard]

Well at least they have ground radar now

 

[TangoBearFox]

His answers were confusing, but it only makes sense if it's MSL. That'd be 200-300 AGL.
And he also said the tower was 900 feet tall.

I'd recommend reading through all 293 pages of the ATC interview transcript. There's some very interesting things in there. Also don't miss the Contract Weather Observer interview. It starts on Page 238. They have no internet, no equipment other than an ASOS, and are a couple floors up the building in a room with no windows. Doesn't really impact the SWA/FDX incident, but just as an overall view of what they're dealing with, you should read it.

That interview with everyone at the facility was wild. The whole interview with the controller is just letting that dude hang himself. Then the facility interview is damning to the whole FAA about how AUS is run at least at the time, idk if it's gotten better.

 

[echster]

There were three companies selected to provide similar Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) solutions under the Surface Awareness Initiative (SAI). They are: Indra Air Traffic Inc., SAAB, Inc., and uAvionix. Under the SAI, the FAA selected 45 sites for installation with the first five sites prioritized for install before July 1, 2024.

Below is from the contract documents as it relates to the sites, site selection and site priority:

Attachment A

Initial Airport Site Listing

The first five airports have been prioritized to receive a SAI solution, however, the FAA reserves the right to revise the priority, as needed. The FAA will identify a site priority listing of the remaining 40 sites as a future activity.

 

[Homsar]

There were three companies selected to provide similar Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) solutions under the Surface Awareness Initiative (SAI). They are: Indra Air Traffic Inc., SAAB, Inc., and uAvionix. Under the SAI, the FAA selected 45 sites for installation with the first five sites prioritized for install before July 1, 2024.

Below is from the contract documents as it relates to the sites, site selection and site priority:

Attachment A

Initial Airport Site Listing

The first five airports have been prioritized to receive a SAI solution, however, the FAA reserves the right to revise the priority, as needed. The FAA will identify a site priority listing of the remaining 40 sites as a future activity.

View attachment 9617

Where did that list come from?

 

[TangoBearFox]

There were three companies selected to provide similar Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) solutions under the Surface Awareness Initiative (SAI). They are: Indra Air Traffic Inc., SAAB, Inc., and uAvionix. Under the SAI, the FAA selected 45 sites for installation with the first five sites prioritized for install before July 1, 2024.

Below is from the contract documents as it relates to the sites, site selection and site priority:

Attachment A

Initial Airport Site Listing

The first five airports have been prioritized to receive a SAI solution, however, the FAA reserves the right to revise the priority, as needed. The FAA will identify a site priority listing of the remaining 40 sites as a future activity.

View attachment 9617

This list is so damning to the FAA that the majority of these busy facilities don't have ASDE for the over 2 decades its been recommended, the FAA doesn't give a fuck about safety.