Midair Collision DCA

I've never had an appreciate for management's efforts to always blame Controllers for everything...they love to do that.

But, watching the FALCON playback, even though the HELO says they are maintaining visual, they never maneuvered away from the CRJ or the course the CRJ was going to fly. I believe the HELO saw the correct traffic but didn't have an understanding (good mental picture) of what it was doing or where/how it was going to go/fly.

I'm not sure what else was going on in the cab (workload), but the CA was going off for a long time prior to impact and no traffic was ever exchanged to the CRJ. When the HELO didn't move or change course away from the CRJ AND/OR its projected flight path, instead of wasting time just telling the HELO to pass behind, there should have been a traffic alert and a very strong positive control instruction...the Controller should have moved the HELO or even better just sent the CRJ around.

That's what makes the job tricky. You can't work traffic for what's happening now. You have to project and work the traffic for (sometimes) minutes into the future.

I'm not trying to blame the Controller, but in my opinion there's things on our end that could have been done differently.
 
It can be VERY difficult to discern depth, distance and relative motion on a light coming at you l (even more difficult if using NVG’s). It’s even why in motorcycling they advise not using your high beams during the day because it’s actually more difficult for a car to gauge your distance and closure rate. There are many different possible reasons for this aside from the airspace design and procedures. How many of us have had the CA go off for sircrsft that are in no possible universe a factor with eachother? How many times have you had it go off even after the 2 planes passed each other 2 miles ago? Or have an area where it goes off routinely like on a final that goes over another airport or a VFR corridor? How many have breathed that sigh of relief after someone confirms they’ll maintain visual and moved on to the next task? How many of us have missed a traffic call?

And let this be a lesson for how quickly you can be all over the tv and internet. Remember that the next time you want to scold a pilot or get in an argument on frequency etc.

And whoever leaked the Falcon, you’re dumb af.
 
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NATCA should be on the news explaining how the controller has XXX amount of overtime this year and is clearly fatigued because of our staffing crisis we’ve been in for 10+ years. Instead our union does nothing for the situation and sits on their hands while the controller will get chastised about what he “should” have done.
 
Fly the helicopter for the pilot?
With the benefit of hindsight you could argue he could have done more.

The initial traffic call to PAT25 was good, but it was followed with “visual separation approved” without callsign (minor thing) and the traffic wasn’t given to JIA5342.

Later, while obviously converging and CA going off in the background, the controller somewhat urgently asks PAT25 if they have the CRJ in sight (they’re already maintaining visual so the controller is questioning what the pilot is doing) and then says “PAT25 pass behind the CRJ”. This should have been a traffic alert with control instructions. This was about 15 seconds before impact.

JIA was never told about the helicopter as far as I can tell even though the targets were very likely to merge.

I’m in no way blaming the controller for this. He was very busy and likely works helicopters through his airspace very regularly and without incident. When something like this happens we just have to be honest and ask what we could do better. I feel for this guy. He sounds like a solid controller.
 
From NATCA...


NATCA Family,

NATCA mourns the tragic loss of life as a result of the accident that occurred at Washington National (DCA) airport last night between a regional jet and a helicopter. Our thoughts are with the family and friends of those affected by this event, and we offer our condolences to our brothers and sisters in ALPA and AFA and all those involved in this tragedy.

I, along with other leaders of NATCA, have been in contact with the members working at DCA to offer assistance and provide the necessary resources at this time.

We cannot comment on the specifics, and it would be premature to speculate on the root cause of this accident. We will wait for the National Transportation Safety Board to complete its work and use that information to help guide decisions and changes to enhance and improve aviation safety.

America’s highly trained and skilled air traffic controllers all do amazing work every day keeping the nation's passengers and cargo moving safely and efficiently to their destinations. We serve quietly, but events like this remind us of the weight we bear. This job is more than a profession; it's a responsibility we hold deeply, and when tragedy strikes, it stays with us.

Please stay focused and stay strong as these events unfold.

Thank you all again for the work you do.

In Solidarity,

Nick Daniels
NATCA President
 
I’m in no way blaming the controller for this. He was very busy and likely works helicopters through his airspace very regularly and without incident. When something like this happens we just have to be honest and ask what we could do better. I feel for this guy. He sounds like a solid controller.
I don't think the controller is to blame either; they weren't perfect but everything sounded clean and it's absurd to think double confirmation of control instructions and visual isn't enough. But you know (as evidenced on here already and by the President's own statement last night) that ATC is going to be scapegoated regardless with "they should have done more."

It's now about 16 hours removed from the incident and there is still 0 statements or releases from NATCA establishing a wall of defense for the controllers involved. Within an hour we had the audio and radar replay on here; zero excuses why NATCA couldn't have had a talking head on any of the news programs by 10pm with enough general control knowledge to lay a foundation of defense for this career field.
 
NATCA should be on the news explaining how the controller has XXX amount of overtime this year and is clearly fatigued because of our staffing crisis we’ve been in for 10+ years. Instead our union does nothing for the situation and sits on their hands while the controller will get chastised about what he “should” have done.

Right now is absolutely not the time to appear to be trying to leverage this disaster. But NATCA should have been ringing these alarm bells for the last decade, but now people will just say “well why did you never say anything?” because NATCA didn’t want to appear alarmist.
 
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I don't think the controller is to blame either; they weren't perfect but everything sounded clean and it's absurd to think double confirmation of control instructions and visual isn't enough. But you know (as evidenced on here already and by the President's own statement last night) that ATC is going to be scapegoated regardless with "they should have done more."

It's now about 16 hours removed from the incident and there is still 0 statements or releases from NATCA establishing a wall of defense for the controllers involved. Within an hour we had the audio and radar replay on here; zero excuses why NATCA couldn't have had a talking head on any of the news programs by 10pm with enough general control knowledge to lay a foundation of defense for this career field.
I'd bet $100 NATCA leadership got more sleep last night than I did over this (no, I didn't work the mid), and I don't even work at DCA.
 
Right now is absolutely not the time to appear to be trying to leverage this disaster. But NATCA should have been ringing these alarm bells for the last decade, but now people will just say “well why did you never say anything?”

We lost the ability to control any narrative once Trump blasted away on Truth Social. The general public will fall in line that it could have been prevented.

The Monday-morning quarterbacking is exhausting. Each and every one of us can say what we may have done different. We all know the going's on behind the scenes when we are working.

Let's hope the controller is doing ok! I cannot fathom the amount of strain on that particular person. Let's not pile on and make this situation worse.
 
We lost the ability to control any narrative once Trump blasted away on Truth Social. The general public will fall in line that it could have been prevented.

The Monday-morning quarterbacking is exhausting. Each and every one of us can say what we may have done different. We all know the going's on behind the scenes when we are working.

Let's hope the controller is doing ok! I cannot fathom the amount of strain on that particular person. Let's not pile on and make this situation worse.

Indeed. And it really doesn’t matter how much rest or staffing you have, if someone tells you they’ll maintain visual and then flies right into the person they said they’d avoid there’s only so much a controller can do.


Have a version one doesn’t need to sign up for?
 
Right now is absolutely not the time to appear to be trying to leverage this disaster. But NATCA should have been ringing these alarm bells for the last decade, but now people will just say “well why did you never say anything?” because NATCA didn’t want to appear alarmist.
Don’t need to leverage anything but facts need to be said to the public. That perfectly drafted email sent out this morning to union members doesn’t do a damn thing but if they said something even that simple to the public it makes a huge difference. Advocating for silence and letting the media or president spin something like this whatever way they want is bad for all controllers. Our union should always have a statement even if it changes as more details emerge.
 
I don't know how many times I'm going to post today...guess I just need to "talk", grieve, be frustrated, and angry.

I'm not working today, but for those who are, no matter how much we hate each other, the Agency, and the Union let's just make sure we work together to keep our airplanes apart.

I feel (because I see and hear it a lot) that far too often we relay on "maintain visual separation" and an airplane being VFR as a means to stop "controlling" them. Maintain visual separation and a VFR airplane(s) simply means that other forums of (radar/non-radar) separation are no longer required. That doesn't mean you (we) stop ensuring they are going to collide and stop issuing positive control instruction to prevent such collision if a pilot appears to be deviating from providing their own separation.

The FAA bogs us down with a lot of crap. Time on position, rotations, sick leave letters, stupid training initiative hours, make sure your weather briefing is done, OT, new rest rules, broken equipment, weak leadership...the list goes on. I think that the basic, core responsibly we have gets buried under all that crap.
 
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Advocating for silence and letting the media or president spin something like this whatever way they want is bad for all controllers.

I’m not advocating for silence but I’m certainly going to speak against the Union coming out “well we’re on 6 day weeks and short staffed what did you expect?” out of the blue before the bodies have even been pulled from the water.
 
When something like this happens we just have to be honest and ask what we could do better. I feel for this guy. He sounds like a solid controller.

Agree. Nobody thinks having two aircraft collide is the best outcome. So the question really is - what do we as controllers do to make better outcomes in the future? Do we use this event as a learning lesson or do we just ignore new facts that don't fit what we already know?

Lots of aviation incidents are due to low probability high risk factors. This means that we don't get to see consequences for actions every time we (or a pilot) undermines a healthy margin of safety. This an hinder our understanding of risks we take every day, and pitfalls that pilots fall info.
 
I feel (because I see and hear it a lot) that far too often we relay on "maintain visual separation" and an airplane being VFR as a means to stop "controlling" them. Maintain visual separation and a VFR airplane(s) simply means that other forums of (radar/non-radar) separation are longer required. That doesn't mean you (we) stop ensuring they are going to collide and stop issuing positive control instruction to prevent such collision if a pilot appears to be deviating from providing their own separation.
I absolutely understand where you are coming from.

Considering this airspace (known helo corridors) and traffic level, it seems like issuing control instructions twice to the helo pilot of what was going on and them acknowledging the instructions along with confirming visual seems as close to effective positive control as you can be. We can always make the excuse about not creating situations you need to watch, but when it comes to helos pretty much every situation can become one you need to watch because of their ability of movement.

This is a disaster and a tragedy and in due time the investigation may reveal a new way to control these situations, but considering there is currently only one known survivor (the controller) it would be best if we as professionals instinctively outwardly defended the controller involved instead of offering "no comment, we work hard, thoughts & prayers" like NATCA just did.
 
I've never had an appreciate for management's efforts to always blame Controllers for everything...they love to do that.

But, watching the FALCON playback, even though the HELO says they are maintaining visual, they never maneuvered away from the CRJ or the course the CRJ was going to fly. I believe the HELO saw the correct traffic but didn't have an understanding (good mental picture) of what it was doing or where/how it was going to go/fly.

I'm not sure what else was going on in the cab (workload), but the CA was going off for a long time prior to impact and no traffic was ever exchanged to the CRJ. When the HELO didn't move or change course away from the CRJ AND/OR its projected flight path, instead of wasting time just telling the HELO to pass behind, there should have been a traffic alert and a very strong positive control instruction...the Controller should have moved the HELO or even better just sent the CRJ around.

That's what makes the job tricky. You can't work traffic for what's happening now. You have to project and work the traffic for (sometimes) minutes into the future.

I'm not trying to blame the Controller, but in my opinion there's things on our end that could have been done differently.

This and a lot of people are missing the forest for the trees by fixating on the visual separation and who assumes risk. Why in the first place does the rulebook put controllers and aircraft in this situation. More are worried about the optics than the people affected and the policies in place.

VFR shouldn't be cleared thru the short final of class B and if they are, the spacing didn't allow it.
 
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