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Lots of news today.
So bold, so brave
edit: attached the study that was linked
Here's the AI summary of the study 'specially for you CPC's (Claude is sympathetic)
The Air Traffic Controller Workforce Imperative (2025) is an independent expert review commissioned by the FAA and Congress to examine the controller shortage, analyze two competing staffing models, assess fatigue and safety concerns, and recommend a path forward. Here's what it found.
Between FY 2013 and 2023, FAA hired about two-thirds of what its own models said it needed. The committee found that the shortage was driven almost entirely by factors outside the workforce's control:
The result: by end of FY 2023, the workforce had shrunk by about 1,763 people from its 2013 peak, including a loss of over 1,160 CPCs. This is why you're working the overtime you're working.
There are two competing formulas for determining how many controllers each facility should have. This is at the heart of the NATCA–FAA dispute:
FAA/AFN Model (the traditional approach):
CRWG Model (developed collaboratively with NATCA):
The committee's conclusion: Keep the AFN model as the foundation, but fix it. The CRWG's survey approach for incorporating local facility conditions is valuable and should be adopted as a supplement. Neither model perfectly captures what's happening on your floor.
The committee examined the "rattler" (2-2-1 schedule) and fatigue in depth, building on a 2024 expert panel report by sleep scientists Rosekind, Flynn-Evans, and Czeisler.
Key findings:
The committee's analysis of 15 years of individual controller records revealed concerning trends:
The 19 Level 10–12 facilities that are more than 15% below their staffing targets — mostly TRACONs and Centers in major metro areas — represent only 6% of facilities but account for:
Staffing delays at just seven facilities accounted for 86% of all reported staffing-related delay minutes in 2024. The estimated cost to passengers and airlines from staffing delays in 2024 alone: $135–$165 million.
There are no En Route Centers currently more than 10% above their targets — meaning there's no pool of surplus Center CPCs who could transfer to fix the shortage. The only real solution for Centers is to hire and wait several years for people to certify.
Key recommendations directed at FAA and Congress:
The process from application to CPC is long and demanding:
The age limit to apply is 31 (this may be raised). You'll need U.S. citizenship, a security clearance, a medical, and a passing score on FAA's ATSA screening test. College isn't required — a high school diploma plus one year of work experience qualifies you to apply. Military ATC experience opens a separate, faster track.
The job is demanding, the training pipeline is long, and many facilities are still understaffed. But the committee's findings make clear: the workforce shortage is recognized at the highest levels, Congress has mandated action, hiring is ramping up, and the fatigue problems that have been tolerated for decades are finally being addressed. The profession is being taken seriously.
So bold, so brave
edit: attached the study that was linked
Here's the AI summary of the study 'specially for you CPC's (Claude is sympathetic)
What This Report Is About — And Why It Matters to You
The Air Traffic Controller Workforce Imperative (2025) is an independent expert review commissioned by the FAA and Congress to examine the controller shortage, analyze two competing staffing models, assess fatigue and safety concerns, and recommend a path forward. Here's what it found.
The Staffing Shortfall Is Real — And It's Not Your Fault
Between FY 2013 and 2023, FAA hired about two-thirds of what its own models said it needed. The committee found that the shortage was driven almost entirely by factors outside the workforce's control:
- 2013 sequestration and government shutdown — a hiring freeze was imposed mid-year
- Administrative missteps in 2014–2015 — a bungled restructuring of the hiring process wiped out years of applicant pipelines
- FESSA legislation in 2016 — a well-intentioned law inadvertently capped hiring by requiring balanced pools
- 2018–2019 government shutdown — the longest in U.S. history, which again slashed hiring goals
- COVID-19 (2020–2022) — the Academy shut down for four months; facility OJT paused for up to two years; some contractor trainers were let go and never fully returned
The result: by end of FY 2023, the workforce had shrunk by about 1,763 people from its 2013 peak, including a loss of over 1,160 CPCs. This is why you're working the overtime you're working.
The Two Staffing Models: What's Being Debated
There are two competing formulas for determining how many controllers each facility should have. This is at the heart of the NATCA–FAA dispute:
FAA/AFN Model (the traditional approach):
- Uses mathematical traffic workload models to calculate how many position-qualified controllers are needed on a 90th-percentile traffic day
- Projects future staffing needs 10+ years out — critical for hiring pipeline planning
- Staffing "target" counts CPCs and CPC-ITs together
- Currently set at 12,242 controllers nationally
- Weakness: Its workload models for towers and TRACONs haven't been updated since 2008 and 2009; it likely underestimates time needed for training and other duties
CRWG Model (developed collaboratively with NATCA):
- Uses surveys of facility managers and union reps to determine position coverage needs
- Counts only CPCs (not CPC-ITs or DEVs)
- Incorporates more time for training, team meetings, labor-management activities, and other duties
- Currently set at 14,633 CPCs — about 30% higher than the AFN target
- Weakness: Likely overestimates required Other Duties time; assumes none of those activities can happen during slow periods; can't forecast future traffic demand
The committee's conclusion: Keep the AFN model as the foundation, but fix it. The CRWG's survey approach for incorporating local facility conditions is valuable and should be adopted as a supplement. Neither model perfectly captures what's happening on your floor.
Fatigue: The Report Validates What You've Been Saying
The committee examined the "rattler" (2-2-1 schedule) and fatigue in depth, building on a 2024 expert panel report by sleep scientists Rosekind, Flynn-Evans, and Czeisler.
Key findings:
- The 2-2-1 schedule is being eliminated. FAA issued an order in April 2024 to extend minimum rest between shifts. New rules took effect January 2025: 10 hours between all shifts, 12 hours before and after midnight shifts. The 2-2-1 is targeted for full elimination in 2026.
- Fatigue rule violations are widespread. FAA's own analysis found over 4,000 fatigue rule violations in published FY 2024 schedules alone — across virtually every category of rule (minimum time off between shifts, consecutive workdays, rolling 7-day hours).
- The scheduling software situation is a failure. FAA spent years developing OPAS (a fatigue-compliant scheduling tool), reached agreement with NATCA to implement it, successfully ran it at two Centers — and then abandoned the effort in 2017. Facilities currently rely on "WMT Web Schedules," which the committee notes "makes no effort to prevent schedulers from creating schedule violations of all but a very narrow set of existing fatigue rules."
- Overtime is not just a staffing problem. The committee found that overtime has increased significantly even at well-staffed facilities, suggesting inefficient shift scheduling is also a driver. At one facility (Columbus Tower), operations decreased and staffing increased — yet overtime went up 23%.
Training: A Pipeline Under Stress
The committee's analysis of 15 years of individual controller records revealed concerning trends:
- Training success rates are falling. By FY 2019, only 61% of all hires ultimately reached CPC status, down from 81% in FY 2010. For AGs in Centers, the rate had dropped to 46%.
- Time to certification at Level 10–12 facilities has grown dramatically. At En Route Centers specifically, average training time rose from 3.1 years (FY 2010) to 4.3 years (FY 2019). When you add the 6–12 months from tentative hire offer to training start, we're talking nearly 5 years from offer to CPC at a Center.
- The NTI (National Training Initiative) is the right response, but it's too early to measure its impact. The committee supports it and urges continued management accountability for training progression.
- Transfers are under-performing. About 700 voluntary transfers happen each year, second only to new hires in staffing impact. But since 2016, only 18–24% of transfers from overstaffed facilities have gone to understaffed ones. FAA has not used its authority to offer meaningful financial incentives except in the most extreme cases (like the $100,000 relocation bonuses offered to some N90 controllers relocating to Philadelphia).
The Facilities That Are Really Hurting
The 19 Level 10–12 facilities that are more than 15% below their staffing targets — mostly TRACONs and Centers in major metro areas — represent only 6% of facilities but account for:
- 27% of all commercial operations
- 40% of all nationwide delays
- 45% of "other delays" (which include staffing-related delays)
Staffing delays at just seven facilities accounted for 86% of all reported staffing-related delay minutes in 2024. The estimated cost to passengers and airlines from staffing delays in 2024 alone: $135–$165 million.
There are no En Route Centers currently more than 10% above their targets — meaning there's no pool of surplus Center CPCs who could transfer to fix the shortage. The only real solution for Centers is to hire and wait several years for people to certify.
What the Report Recommends
Key recommendations directed at FAA and Congress:
- Staff facilities according to modeled targets, particularly the 19 high-impact facilities. Use increased financial incentives to move CPCs from overstaffed to understaffed facilities.
- Update the AFN workload models (some are 15+ years old) and establish a process to review them regularly.
- Adopt a structured survey process (like the CRWG's) as a supplement to the AFN model for capturing local conditions.
- Implement proper fatigue risk management — a real FRMS, not a nominal one — and procure functional shift scheduling software.
- Evaluate the ATSA screening test to reduce training failures and improve CPC production rates.
- Expand E-CTI programs so more candidates can bypass the Academy and start OJT faster.
- Conduct the staffing-safety research that has been recommended since 2014 but never completed, so future decisions can be grounded in data.
- Congress should fund both adequate hiring and meaningful transfer incentives.
For Those Considering Becoming a Controller
The process from application to CPC is long and demanding:
- Application → background/medical clearance: typically 6–12 months (can be up to 2 years for complex cases)
- FAA Academy: 3–5 months, depending on track (Terminal or Center)
- OJT to first CPC at a lower-level Terminal: roughly 1.5–2 years
- Transfer and recertification at a higher-level facility: another 1.5–2 years
- Total from hire offer to CPC at a Level 10–12 Center: averaging nearly 5 years
The age limit to apply is 31 (this may be raised). You'll need U.S. citizenship, a security clearance, a medical, and a passing score on FAA's ATSA screening test. College isn't required — a high school diploma plus one year of work experience qualifies you to apply. Military ATC experience opens a separate, faster track.
The job is demanding, the training pipeline is long, and many facilities are still understaffed. But the committee's findings make clear: the workforce shortage is recognized at the highest levels, Congress has mandated action, hiring is ramping up, and the fatigue problems that have been tolerated for decades are finally being addressed. The profession is being taken seriously.
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